This paper investigates the determinants of survival, acquisition and non-survival for internet firms that have gone public at the NASDAQ stock exchange from December 1996 through February 2001. We analyze two models, survivors versus non-survivors and survivors versus acquired firms with the help of the Cox proportional hazard method. We have selected all internet firms that went public during the internet bubble. The paper presents a model that includes a number of new and earlier examined, explanatory variables simultaneously that are often studied separately and for noninternet firms in other studies. The key issue of the study is that our models provide a prediction of the rate of non-survival or acquisition of internet firms.
Introduction
This paper studies internet firms that have gone public at the NASDAQ stock exchange during the throughout the studied period. Acquired firms are firms, which after IPO are acquired by an existing firm or taken private. Non-survivors are classified as firms that are delisted from the exchange.
Our research design was specifically chosen to focus on the key issue of this study: the variables that predict the rate of success, failure, and acquisition of firms in the internet industry. We use both financial and non-financial information that is available to investors from the IPO prospectuses. The effect of financial information is measured through several financial multiples, such as net sales over assets and operating income over assets. In addition to financial information, we examine firm-specific non-financial information, such as firm risk, lead investment bank reputation, and insider ownership retention. Finally, we control our results for a number of different sub-sectors of the internet industry. Although many papers have analyzed internet firm value (for instance Bartov et al, 2002; Demers and Lev, 2001; Demers and Lewellen, 2003; Johnston and Madura, 2002; Knauff et al, 2003; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003; Ritter, 2002 and 2003) , to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first that focuses on the analysis of survival determinants for internet firms only. Also, our model incorporates a number of new and earlier examined, explanatory variables simultaneously that are often studied separately and for non-internet firms in other studies.
Due to the structure of the data involved, i.e. having a duration dependent variable where some survival periods are censored (see section 4 hereafter), we use the Cox (1972) proportional hazard method to investigate, which variables determine the rate of success and failure of internet firms. In addition to comparing mean differences, which can be classified as a two-sample analysis, we account for all cross-correlations between the explanatory variables by using Cox regression model. The Cox proportional hazard method is used because of its flexibility. This method does not assume a particular parametric baseline hazard function, since economic theory does not provide a parametric specification. Instead, the method provides the impact explanatory variables have on the hazard rate, whatever functional form the hazard rate may have. In this paper, the hazard rate gives an indication of the likelihood that an internet firm will be non-surviving or acquired.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes our data sample and the related statistics. Section three discusses our hypotheses on internet firm survival. The fourth section presents the Cox proportional hazard method. Section five contains the empirical results, and the final section summarizes and concludes the paper.
Data and Descriptive Statistics

Sample Selection
This paper studies the survivability of U.S. internet IPOs that went public during the period December 1996 through February 2001 . Following Hand (2000 , internet firms are defined as firms obtaining more than fifty percent of their revenues through or because of the internet. Since this definition does not rule out arbitrariness, we have compiled our sample from two sources of internet IPOs. Our first source is a list of 527 internet-related offerings used by Loughran and Ritter (2003) , who obtained their data by merging and amending internet identifications of Thomson Financial Securities Data, Dealogic and IPOmonitor.com. Next, we matched this list against the firms marked as internet-related by our second source, www.edgar-online.com. IPOs documented by both sources are included in our initial sample, which contains 382 firms.
In order to be included in the final sample, firms have to meet two criteria. First, firms must be listed at the NASDAQ stock exchange exchange to create equal delisting norms throughout the sample. Second, the final prospectus must be available at www.sec.gov, including annual accounts covering a full fiscal year. Furthermore, unit offerings and financial institutions are excluded from the sample, as the characteristics of these IPOs differ significantly from other offerings.
From our initial sample, 13 firms were excluded because they were issued at an exchange other than the NASDAQ. Compared to firms remaining listed and firms delisted for non-negative reasons Shumway and Warther (1999) find negative returns for firms delisted from the NASDAQ stock exchange for negative reasons. With respect to acquired firms, Andrews and Welbourne (1996) and Jain and Kini (2000) document that these firms underperform compared to surviving firms in the period prior to acquisition. Therefore, we designate survival as more desirable than being acquired from an investor and issuer perspective. Figure 2 illustrates the time allocation of delistings and acquisitions of the firms studied in this paper. Although there are concentrations of delisted firms in some quarters, the burst of the internet bubble of spring 2000 is not evident from these statistics.
< Insert Figure 2 about here> 1 We refer to www.nasdaq.com for delisting requirements. Figure 3 provides the distribution of the aftermarket IPO status by year of issuance. As the aftermarket status of our sample firms has been determined on the same date for all firms (April 22, 2003) , the examined period differs per firm, depending on its offering date. Firms with a short trading history would be expected to have the highest survival rates and the lowest rates for acquisition and non-survival. However, the figure shows an inverse relation between the trading history and nonsurvivors. This seems to support the notion that during the last phase of the period examined the internet industry was turning into a hot market, with weaker firms going public due to reduced scrutiny of investors (see Ritter, 1984) . Another explanation is provided by Schultz and Zaman (2001) , who argue that early issuing firms had a first mover advantage in a highly competitive market, which was characterized by consolidation.
<Insert Figure 3 which clients have to connect. Finally, the group of internet services firms consists of companies providing professional internet services and internet advertisement agencies. The former create revenues by charging an hourly fee for their consulting services, while the latter receive a commission on the advertising income generated by their clients. Table 1 provides the allocation of survivors, non-survivors and acquired firms by sub-sector.
The distribution indicates the failure rate is relatively high for firms in the ISP, content/portals, ecommerce products and IT-infrastructure network sub-sectors. Furthermore, the internet services market seems to be characterized more by consolidation compared to other sub-sectors.
Summary statistics of the independent variables
In this section we describe the independent variables used to explain the three post-issue states of the Internet IPOs. Table 2 lists the explanatory variables and provides a description of each of them. <Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here> The Pearson correlation matrix of the explanatory variables is in the appendix. Regarding the IPO firms' financial ratios the correlation matrix shows high correlations between several ratios. As can be seen in the appendix, these concern the following variables: net income over assets, operating income over assets, operating cash flow over assets, total liabilities over total assets, and net working capital over assets. Consequently, we have not included those correlated variables in our model simultaneously. Furthermore, after analyzing the correlation matrix of the subset of the survivors and acquired firms (not reported) we found a relatively high correlation between the variables firm size and investor demand. Because the effect of investor demand for acquired firms is of less importance than firm size at the moment of acquisition, we have only included firm size and omitted investor demand in our regression of survivors versus acquired firms. Table 4 presents the mean differences of the explanatory variables for the three aftermarket states examined. In general, a majority of the mean differences regarding the offering and firm characteristics are significant, whereas those of the financial ratios except for the net sales over assets and receivables over total assets are not. These findings are consistent with the small relevance of accounting information for the internet industry reported by a number of authors (for instance, see Hand, 2001; Rajgopal et al, 2003; and Trueman et al, 2000) . As can be seen in <Insert Table 4 about here>
Hypotheses
In this section, we discuss the hypotheses examined. With the exception of hypothesis H3, we use the same hypotheses regarding a firm's hazard rate for both models, i.e. the survivors versus nonsurvivors model as well as the survivors versus acquired firms model.
A common way to quantify firm specific risk is using the standard deviation of aftermarket returns. However, before the offering stakeholders do not know aftermarket returns. Therefore, we follow Beatty and Welch (1996), Hensler et al (1997) and Van der Goot (2003) by using the number of risk factors reported in the IPO prospectus as a direct measure for ex ante firm-specific risk. Hence, the first hypothesis is:
H1:
There is a positive relation between the number of risk factors and the hazard rate of a firm.
Investment banks, also referred to as underwriters, depend on their reputation capital to generate new business. The investment banks with the highest reputation are considered to be more successful at performing activities, such as taking firms public. This creates an incentive to be selective at picking firms for offering, to monitor firms after the offering and to create interest for the firms' stocks by distributing analyst reports (see Hansen and Torregrosa, 1992; Macklin et al, 1992; Jain and Kini, 1999a and Aggarwal, 2000) . The measure we use for investment bank reputation is based on the relative placement of underwriters in tombstone advertisements, as originally developed by Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) and later updated and amended by Loughran and Ritter (2003) for the period 1980 through 2000. All authors assign higher scores to higher reputation underwriters, and vice versa. We assign a value of 1 to offerings taken public by investment banks with reputations of 8 or 9; a value of 0 is assigned to an IPO if the reputation of the lead manager is lower.
H2:
A high reputation of the lead manager is inversely related to a firm's hazard rate.
Our third hypothesis is based on the notion that larger firms have better access to the capital market and are better equipped to withstand rough market conditions and adverse outcomes of investment decisions. Many studies document a higher risk of failure for smaller firms (Schultz, 1993; Hensler et al, 1997; Jain and Kini, 1999b) . However, Banz (1981) reports that the size effect is most pronounced among the smallest NASDAQ firms. Shumway and Warther (1999) argue that this relationship is a consequence of a delisting bias of the NASDAQ data. After correcting for this delisting bias Shumway and Warther (1999) do not find a significant relation between a firm's size and its performance. Since we account for delisting due to acquisition, on the one hand, and non-survival for negative reasons (see section 2.1 before), on the other, we do not expect an association between firm size and non-surviving firms, but we do expect an association between firm size and acquired firms. Because a small firm is easier to acquire than a large one, we expect an inverse association between acquired firms and firm size. We use the logarithm of the dollar amount of the gross offering proceeds as a measure of size. Therefore, we test two hypotheses:
H3.1: Regarding non-survivors, there is no relationship between firm size and its hazard rate.
H3.2: Regarding acquired firms, there is an inverse relationship between firm size and its hazard rate.
Before an IPO takes place, an investment bank sets a preliminary price range and conducts road shows to market the offering. During the road show, the investment bank receives signals about investors' interest in the offering. Guided by these signals, an investment bank may decide to adjust the initial price range, where upward adjustments indicate high investor demand. Following Hanley (1993), the measure of this investor demand is the price change of the final offer price as percentage of the average value of the initial price range, where we also correct for changes in the number of shares offered. As aforementioned, in the correlation matrix of the subset of surviving and acquired firms, there is a high correlation between firm size and investor demand. Therefore, we have included the latter variable in the model of survivors versus non-survivors only.
H4:
A firm's survival is an increasing function of investor demand.
Investment banks start the process of marketing an IPO by setting an initial price range as required by the regulatory authorities. At that time, there are only limited indications regarding investors' interest in the firm. Consequently, investment banks are depending on their own judgment for setting the preliminary price range. High uncertainty about firm valuation, for instance, due to a limited operating history or the infant industry argument, is likely to result in relatively large spreads of the initial price range. Jain and Kini (1999b) relate this valuation uncertainty to uncertainty about a firm's performance after the offering. They measure valuation uncertainty as the dollar spread of the initial price range divided by the average value of the initial price range. The authors find a negative relationship between valuation uncertainty and firm survival. Therefore, the prediction is:
H5:
A firm's hazard rate is an increasing function of valuation uncertainty. Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that a firm's owners can signal quality in equity markets by retaining equity. Consistent with their signaling theory, a high percentage of insider ownership retention at IPOs serves as a certification that managerial decisions will coincide with the outside shareholders' interest, which results in better firm performance after the offering (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , and a longer survival period (Hensler et al, 1997) . Insider ownership retention is measured as the number of shares held by the original owners as percentage of the total number of shares outstanding after the offering.
H6:
A firm's hazard rate is inversely related to the percentage of insider ownership retention at the offering.
Several authors (for instance, Ritter, 1991; Jegadeesh et al, 1993; Hensler et al, 1997) document the relation between a firm's age at the time of offering and its risk. The rationale behind this finding is twofold. First, older firms are more mature and in a more steady state and, therefore, have less uncertainty about future operating performance. Second, management of mature firms is in a better position to reduce information asymmetry at the time of offering when a firm has a longer operating history. We examine total firm age as well as the age of its internet activities at the time of offering to capture the fact that several non-internet firms have transformed their business model to become internet firms.
H7:
A firm's hazard rate is a decreasing function of both its whole operating history and the duration of its internet activities at the time of offering.
Managers recognize periods, in which equity market levels are relatively high, e.g. due to over-optimism about the earnings potential of young growth companies. They take advantage of these 'windows of opportunity' by taking their firms public, which results in IPO volume peaks (Lowry and Schwert, 2002) . Firms, which have gone public during these peaks, underperform relative to other offerings. This can be attributed to lower quality issuers being unable to withstand periods of economic downturn (Ritter, 1991) . This finding is confirmed by Hensler et al (1997) , who report a negative relation between market level at the IPO and firm survival. Market level is measured as the average value of the NASDAQ Composite Index during the month of offering.
H8:
There is a positive relationship between market level at the time of offering and a firm's hazard rate.
Further, we examine the relation between a firm's hazard rate and the log of its offer-to-book ratio. The underwriter sets the IPO offering price at a high level when he meets much interest from sophisticated investors during the book-building period. A high price can be seen as an indication of an internet IPO's high growth opportunities. Therefore, a large offer-to-book ratio is a signal of a relatively high quality internet IPO. In addition, when the offering price is high the firm receives a larger amount of money in its IPO with which it can survive longer. Hence, we hypothesize that the firm's hazard rate is a decreasing function of its offer-to-book ratio.
H9:
There is a negative relation between a firm's hazard rate and its offer-to-book ratio.
Finally, we test the hypothesis that an internet firm's accounting performance prior to the offering affects its survival (for instance, Jain and Kini, 1994; Jain and Kini, 1999b, and Bhabra and Pettway, 2002) . Therefore, we have included in our model financial figures hand-collected from the IPO prospectuses. Those figures are net sales over assets, operating income over assets, operating cash flow over liabilities, and receivables over total assets. When an internet firm uses its total assets measured by its net sales over assets more efficient, we expect that its rate of survival will be greater.
Furthermore, more profitable firms are assumed to stay longer in business. Hence, we hypothesize surviving firms have a greater profitability measured by its income over assets. Finally, we expect a positive relationship between an internet firm's survival and its short term liquidity measured by operating cash flow over liabilities and receivables over total assets, respectively. As reported earlier, we have accounted for correlated financial ratios (see Appendix).
H10: There is a negative relation between a firm's hazard rate and its net sales over assets, its operating income over assets, operating cash flow over liabilities and receivables over total assets, respectively.
Because it is widely acknowledged that firm performance and survivability differ across industries (for instance, Ritter, 1991; Hensler et al, 1997 and Knauff et al, 2003) , we control for industry-specific survivability by including dummies for the different sub-sectors of the internet industry, which are described in detail in section 2.2.
Methodology
This section describes the methods used to analyze our data. We begin by illustrating the characteristics of our dependent variable. Thereafter, we conduct both nonparametric and semiparametric estimates of the hazard function. These estimates enable plotting of the hazard curve and investigation of the effects of our explanatory variables, respectively.
Characteristics of the Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study is the survival time or duration of internet firms on the NASDAQ stock exchange. The duration of acquired firms and non-survivors is measured as the number of months from the IPO through the date of subsequent acquisition or delisting, respectively, dependent on which comes first. The duration of survivors is measured by the number of months from the IPO through the end of the measurement period, April 22, 2003, as their duration has not been completed up to that point.
Duration is completed once an event has occurred that marks a definite end for the duration,
i.e. a delisting or acquisition. As these events are still to occur for surviving firms, the completed durations for these firms cannot be measured, and instead, only uncompleted durations are observed.
These uncompleted durations are called right-censored observations 2 . Models can be estimated with or without censored data, although models including censored data are considered more efficient. Figure   4 graphically illustrates some examples of durations.
We use the Kaplan-Meier methodology (without explanatory variables) for nonparametric estimation of the hazard function. The semiparametric Cox proportional hazard model is used to incorporate explanatory variables. For an extensive theoretical discussion of hazard models, we refer to Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980), Kiefer (1988) and Lancaster (1990) . We refer to delistings and acquisitions as events for the remainder of this section.
<Insert Figure 4 about here>
Nonparametric Estimation of the Hazard Function
As a preliminary analysis, we estimate the shape of the hazard function by the nonparametric Kaplan-Meier (product limit) estimator; see Kaplan and Meier (1958) . Let T be a random variable measuring the duration of an offering at the NASDAQ stock exchange, with duration distribution function 3 F(t) = Pr (T < t) and density function f(t) = dF(t)/dt. When the distribution function of T is specified alternatively, we obtain the survival function S(t) = 1 -F(t) = Pr (T ≥ t), being the probability that random variable T will equal or exceed the value t. Now, our duration data can be characterized in terms of the hazard function, i.e. the probability that an event occurs during an infinitesimal small time interval dt, given that it has survived up to t:
Let t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , ..., t n denote either the completed or censored durations of the n firms in our sample.
Suppose we order the completed durations from smallest to largest, t (1) < t (2) < ... < t (K) , and let h j be the number of events after t (j) months, while m j is the number of firms censored between months t (j) and t (j+1) . If 
for t (j) ≤ t < t (j+1) , where τ j = t (j+1) -t (j) . Equation (2) provides an unconditional estimate of the firms' hazard rate at time t (j) . Figure 5 presents a smoothed plot of this estimation for non-survivors and acquired firms. With respect to non-survivors, the figure illustrates an increasing hazard rate from the offering through around the third year of listing, after which the hazard rate decreases. The peak hazard rate is around two percent per month or around 25 percent annualized. Regarding acquired firms, the figure shows a similar shape. However, the hazard rate peaks earlier compared to the nonsurvivors, at a rate of little more than one percent per month or around 15 percent annualized.
<Insert Figure 5 about here>
Semiparametric Estimation of the Hazard Function
As we do not have strong a priori reasons for imposing a particular functional form on the dependence of a firm's hazard rate on its age, we model this particular relationship nonparametrically. In contrast, the effects of the explanatory variables on the hazard rate are modeled parametrically. The semiparametric Cox proportional hazard model can be written as:
where x i denotes a vector of explanatory variables for the i-th firm with unknown coefficients β, and λ 0 (t) is the baseline hazard function. Cox (1972) has shown that β can be estimated by maximum likelihood. Although the method is semiparametric in nature, it is still able to deliver accurate estimates, i.e. the loss of efficiency is small in comparison to a fully parametric hazard model (see, for instance, Efron, 1977) . When accounting for censoring, it can be shown that the log-likelihood function is given by (for instance, see Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980)
where δ i is the censoring indicator, which has a value of 0 for censored durations and 1 for completed durations, and R (j) is the set of all firms that have remained listed and are uncensored just prior to t (j) .
To account for ties 4 , we have used the Breslow (1974) approximation. Maximum likelihood estimates of β can be obtained through numerical methods.
The significance of the explanatory variables in the model can be measured by the likelihood ratio statistic, given by -2 (log(L 0 ) -log(L n )), where log(L 0 ) denotes the maximum log-likelihood value under the restriction β = 0, and log(L n ) denotes the maximum log-likelihood of the unrestricted estimated model. The likelihood ratio statistic is asymptotically 2 ( ) k χ distributed, where k denotes the dimension of β.
This semiparametric estimation of the hazard function does not allow us to differentiate between survivors, acquired firms and non-survivors in a single regression. Therefore, in order to be complete in our analysis, the next section discusses two regressions: survivors versus non-survivors and survivors versus acquired firms. In sections 5.1 and 5.2 we will discuss the regressions of both the survivors versus non-survivors, and survivors versus acquired firms models. In section 5.3 we will report a number of additional analyses.
Empirical Results
Survivors versus Non-survivors
The regression estimate of survivors versus non-survivors shows that non-survivors have more firmspecific risk, more valuation uncertainty, and a higher market level when they went public. Further, non-survivors are related to lower prestigious underwriters, lower investor demand, less insider ownership retention, lower offer-to-book ratio and ditto operating cash flow over liabilities, all at a statistically significant level. All significant independent variables have the predicted sign.
Additionally, three sub-sectors of the internet industry, E-commerce products, network related ITinfrastructure and internet software on server, have a significant effect on the probability of survival.
Furthermore, table 5 illustrates that several hypothesized relations are not significant in the model for survivors versus non-survivors. Supportive for both the study by Shumway and Warther (1999) and hypothesis H3.1 our regressions show there is no significant size effect for internet firms.
Although directionally consistent with our prediction, we do not find a significant relationship between firm age and survivability. Opposite to the hypothesis H7 the empirical results show that firm survival is a decreasing, not significant function of the operating history of a firm's internet activities.
An explanation for the latter two findings could be that the hypothesized advantage of a mature firm is offset by the first mover advantage of a younger IPO, as described by Schultz and Zaman (2001) . 5 For instance, when looking at the regression for survivors versus non-survivors, an increase of Firm Risk with one risk factor effects the hazard rate with a factor 1.033 (or a 3.3 percent increase). Similarly, a one unit increase of Investor Demand affects the hazard rate with a factor 0.238 (equal to a decrease of 76.2 percent).
Only one of the four financial ratios (operating cash flow over liabilities) is significant and in line with our hypothesis H10. The outcome supports that the internet firms' financial statements prior to the IPO has a limited relation with firm survival. This is consistent with the findings of Trueman et al (2000) that accounting information has been of limited use to investors in valuing internet firms.
To illustrate the estimated proportional hazard model, figure 6 shows two estimated survivor functions for different values of the explanatory variables. The value of the survivor function can be obtained by the equation <Insert Table 5 and Figure 6 about here>
Survivors versus Acquired Firms
As reported earlier, we have found a relatively high correlation between firm size and investor demand. Because after the IPO the effect of investor demand for acquired firms is of less importance than firm size, we have only included firm size in our regression of survivors versus acquired firms.
The significant and inverse relation between firm size and a firm's hazard rate is consistent with the greater likelihood of small internet firms of being acquired. Furthermore, the regression estimate of survivors versus acquired firms illustrates that insider ownership retention is less for acquired firms.
With respect to insider ownership retention, there may be an additional explanation for acquired firms, apart from the signaling hypothesis aforementioned. It is consistent with one of the possible motives for going public, namely the subsequent sale of the firm (Zingales, 1995; Field, 1998 and , Jain and Kini, 1999b) .
Opposite to our hypothesis H7, there is a significant and positive relation between the likelihood that a firm is acquired and the operating history of its internet activities. This finding seems to indicate that firms with a long operating history possess a greater level of experience that is more valuable to the acquirer. Furthermore, supporting hypothesis H9, the likelihood that a firm will be acquired is inversely related to its offer-to-book ratio. The latter is consistent with lower quality firms, and therefore, cheaper firms, are acquired. In addition, two sub-sectors of the internet industry, service related E-commerce and server-based internet software, significantly and positively affect the probability of survival.
The regression results for survivors versus acquired firms show the majority of the regression coefficients is not significant. Although table 4 illustrates that several independent variables differ significantly between surviving and acquired firms, these differences have limited explanatory power in the survivors versus non-survivors model.
Robustness
After controlling for outliers the mean differences from table 4 are qualitatively similar. Furthermore, in order to check the robustness of both our models we have run the regressions presented in table 5 using the significant explanatory variables only. Again, the results of both regressions were qualitatively similar to the results of table 5.
Since the hazard rate is modeled, the usual diagnostic procedures with respect to the residuals cannot be applied to identify outliers in the proportional hazard model. However, there is a way to determine if any of the observations has a disproportionate influence on the estimated parameters. By observations of the survivors versus acquired firms model). For the non-survivor versus survivors regression, the same variables remain significant. However, for the acquired versus survivors regression, one additional variable (receivables over total assets) became significant at the 5% level.
Further investigation showed that the insignificance on the full sample was the result of only 3 observations (1 acquired firm and 2 survivors). Hence, it appears that receivables over total assets are at least partially useful in explaining the likelihood of being acquired.
In addition to the analyses above, we have run a number of Cox regressions using alternative explanatory variables (not reported). With respect to underwriter reputation, we varied the reputation indicators to be included in our dummy variable. Also, we have run regressions using a number of alternative variables for firm size, such as the log of total offer value and the log of the number of employees. As an alternative for insider ownership retention, we have modeled management ownership retention. Finally, in addition to market level at the time of offering, we have controlled for the year and quarter of the year of the offering by including dummies. All those alternative model specifications provided qualitatively similar results.
Conclusions
This study analyses the determinants of survival and acquisition of internet firms that have gone public at the NASDAQ stock exchange from December 1996 through February 2001. We examine both financial and non-financial information that is available to investors from the IPO prospectuses.
We investigate two models, survivors versus non-survivors and survivors versus acquired firms using Cox proportional hazard method. Both models include simultaneously a number of new and earlier examined, explanatory variables that are often studied separately and for non-internet firms in other studies. By taking the correlations between the variables into account, our analysis is safeguarded against spurious relationships. The results show that two explanatory variables, insider ownership retention and the offer-to-book ratio, are significant in both models. Consistent with the hypothesis both non-surviving and acquired internet firms have an inverse relationship between their hazard rate and offer-to-book ratio. Furthermore, compared to both acquired firms and non-survivors, survivors' owners retain a larger share in the firm at IPO. Retainend ownership serves as a certification that managerial decisions will coincide with outside shareholders' interests.
One would expect firms with a short period of listing to have a higher survival rate and, hence, a lower rate of being acquired or non-surviving. However, figure 3 shows a somewhat inverse relation between the period of listing and non-surviving. In addition, figure 6 provides further evidence that during the last phase of the period examined the internet industry was turning into a hot market with weaker firms going public due to reduced scrutiny of investors. Also, consistent with Schultz and Zaman (2001) it appears that early issuing firms have a first mover advantage in a highly competitive market.
Our findings document that non-surviving internet firms can be detected in many ways. In addition to insider ownership retention, survivors differ significantly from non-survivors with respect to a number of offering and firm characteristics as well as financial ratios. The empirical results provide evidence that surviving firms are associated with lower risk, higher underwriter reputation, higher investor demand, lower valuation uncertainty, higher insider ownership retention, a lower NASDAQ market level, and a higher offer-to-book ratio. The findings are consistent with the number of risk factors reported in the prospectuses indicating the firms´ economic fundamentals rather than being a way of reducing legal liability. Furthermore, the latter is supportive for high reputation lead managers being successful in selecting high quality internet firms.
Regarding the survivors versus acquired firms model it appears that, opposite to our prediction, acquired firms have a smaller firm size and a longer operating history in the internet
industry. An explanation for the former finding could be that smaller firms can be easier acquired,
whereas the latter outcome is consistent with firms of having more experience in the internet industry.
Their relatively lower offer-to-book ratio (table 4) is an indication of acquired firms being cheaper and, therefore, are more apt to be acquired. Since we account for delisting due to acquisition, on the one hand, and non-survival for negative reasons, on the other, we do not find a significant relation between a firm's size and its non-survival. The latter outcome is supportive for Shumway and Warther (1999) . Furthermore, the other explanatory variables in the survivors versus acquired firms model are not significant. As can be seen in table 5, the number of significant variables is less in the survivors versus acquired firms than in the survivors versus non-survivors model. The latter is consistent with information asymmetry of acquired firms being smaller.
We have two concluding remarks regarding variables that are not significant in our models.
First, the absence of a significant relationship between the age of the IPO firm and its survival rate may be attributed to the fact that non-internet related activities prior to becoming an internet firm are less relevant. Second, the financial ratios regarding the internet firms' performance prior to IPO only have a limited effect on firm survival and acquisition. An explanation is that internet firms have been far from steady state at the time of offering. Another explanation could be that the internet IPO market was 'hot'. Irrespective of a firm's economic fundamentals investors were willing to buy the shares Q 1 1 9 9 9 Q 2 1 9 9 9 Q 3 1 9 9 9 Q 4 1 9 9 9 Q 1 2 0 0 0 Q 2 2 0 0 0 Q 3 2 0 0 0 Q 4 2 0 0 0 Q 1 2 0 0 1 Q 2 2 0 0 1 Q 3 2 0 0 1 Q 4 2 0 0 1 Q 1 2 0 0 2 Q 2 2 0 0 2 Q 3 2 0 0 2 Q 4 2 0 0 2 Q 1 2 0 0 3 The estimated nonparametric hazard curve (the thin line) is highly volatile due to the limited number of completed durations in our sample. Therefore, the curve has been smoothed using a polynomial regression (the thick line). 
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Figure 6
Estimated survivor functions. The t-statistic in parentheses is calculated as the ratio of the coefficient estimate to its standard error; all t-tests are two-tailed. * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level . 
